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Abstract
MagNet and “Efficient Defenses...” were recently pro-
posed as a defense to adversarial examples. We find that
we can construct adversarial examples that defeat these
defenses with only a slight increase in distortion.
1 Introduction
It is an open question how to train neural networks so
they will be robust to adversarial examples [11]. Re-
cently, three defenses have been proposed to make neural
networks robust to adversarial examples:
• MagNet [8] was proposed as an approach to make
neural networks robust against adversarial examples
through two complementary approaches: adversar-
ial examples near the data manifold are reformed
to lie on the data manifold that are classified cor-
rectly, whereas adversarial examples far away from
the data manifold are detected and rejected before
classification. MagNet does not argue robustness in
the white-box setting; rather, the authors argue that
MagNet is robust in the grey-box setting where the
adversary is aware the defense is in place, knows
the parameters of the base classifier, but not the pa-
rameters of the defense.
• An efficient defense [12] was proposed to make
neural networks more robust against adversarial ex-
amples by performing Gaussian data augmentation
during training, and using the BReLU activation
function. The authors do not claim perfect security,
but claim this makes attacks visually detectable.
• Adversarial Perturbation Elimination GAN (APE-
GAN) [10] is similar to MagNet, only adversarial
examples are projected onto the data manifold using
a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) [2]. We
did not set out to bypass this defense, but found it to
be very similar to MagNet and so we analyze it too.
In this short paper, we demonstrate these three de-
fenses are not effective on the MNIST [5] and CIFAR-10
[4] datasets. We show that we are able to bypass Mag-
Net with greater than 99% success, and the latter two
with 100%, with only a slight increase in distortion.
We defeat MagNet by making use of the transferabil-
ity [11] property of adversarial examples: the adversary
trains their own copy of the defense, constructs adversar-
ial examples on their model, and supplies these adver-
sarial examples to the defender. It turns out that these
examples will also fool the defender’s model.
We defeat “Efficient Defenses Against Adversarial At-
tack” and APE-GAN by showing that existing attack can
defeat them with 100% success without modification.
Adversarial examples are not more visually detectable
than an undefended network.
2 Background
We assume familiarity with neural networks [5], ad-
versarial examples [11], transferability [6], generating
strong attacks against adversarial examples [1] and Mag-
Net [8]. We briefly review the key details and notation.
Notation Let F (x) = y be a neural network used for
classification outputting a probability distribution. Call
the second-to-last layer (the layer before the the softmax
layer) Z, so that F (x) = softmax(Z(x)). Each output yi
corresponds to the predicted probability that the object
x is labelled as class i. Let C(x) = argmaxi F (xi)
correspond to the classification of x on F . In this paper
we are concerned with neural networks used to classify
images (on MNIST and CIFAR-10).
Adversarial examples [11] are instances x′ that are
very close to a normal instance x with respect to some
distance metric (L2 distance, in this paper), but where
C(x′) = t for any target t chosen by the adversary.
We generate adversarial examples with Carlini and
Wagner’s L2 attack algorithm [1]. Specifically, we solve
minimize ‖x′ − x‖22 + c · `(x′)
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where the loss function ` is defined as
`(x′) = max(max{Z(x′)i : i 6= t} − Z(x′)t, 0).
and the constant c is chosen via binary search.
Perhaps the most surprising property of adversarial ex-
amples is transferability [11]: given two different models
that perform the same task, trained on different datasets,
adversarial examples constructed to fool one one model
often fool the other as well. This effect can be amplified
[6] by constructing the adversarial examples to fool mul-
tiple local models before applying it to the target model.
MagNet [8] was recently proposed as a defense to adver-
sarial examples under the grey box threat model: here,
the adversary is aware that MagNet is being used to se-
cure a given classifier, as well as the parameters of the
classifier, but is not aware of the parameters of the de-
fensive models. MagNet has two defense components:
1. The detector examines inputs and decides if they
are adversarial or benign. There can be multiple de-
tectors, in which case if any report “adversarial” the
input is rejected.
2. The reformer takes inputs classified as benign by
the detector(s) and reforms them to remove any re-
maining minor adversarial nature to the instances.
The defender trains multiple reformers and selects
one at random, to prevent the adversary from learn-
ing its parameters.
The authors argue these defenses complement each
other: the detector should be able to detect any adversar-
ial examples with large distortion and are far away from
the true data manifold. The reformer takes instances
which are close to the data manifold and maps them di-
rectly on to the manifold to remove any minor adversarial
perturbations that may not have been detected.
The specific instantiation of the detector and reformer
suggested by the authors are based on auto-encoders.
Given an auto-encoderAE, to detect if an input is adver-
sarial, compare the mean squared error ‖x − AE(x)‖2
with a threshold τ chosen to minimize the false pos-
itive rate. On CIFAR, the authors suggest one fur-
ther detector: compute the Jensen-Shannon divergence
JSD(F (x)/T, F (AE(x))/T ) with temperature T (set
to 10 and 40), and report “adversarial” if the difference
is greater than a different threshold τ ′, also chosen to
minimize the false positive rate.
Similarly, to reform an adversarial example run it
through the auto-encoder and let x ← AE(x): since the
auto-encoder is trained to reconstruct typical instances,
this operation projects it back to the data manifold.
Efficient Defenses Against Adversarial Attacks [12]
works by making two modifications to standard neural
networks. First, the authors propose use of the Bounded
ReLU activation function, defined as BReLU(x) =
min(max(x, 0), 1) instead of standard ReLU [9] which
is unbounded above. Second, instead of training on
the standard training data {(xi, yi)}ni=1 they train on
{(xi+Ni, yi)}ni=1 whereNi ∼ N (0, σ2) is chosen fresh
for each training instance. On MNIST, σ = 0.3; for CI-
FAR, σ = 0.05. The authors claim that despite training
on noise, it is successful on [1].
APE-GAN [10] works by constructing a pre-processing
network G(·) trained to project both normal instances
and adversarial examples back to the data manifold as
done in MagNet. The network G is trained with a GAN
instead of an auto-encoder. Note that unlike a standard
GAN which takes as input a noise vector and must pro-
duce an output image, the generator in APE-GAN takes
in an adversarial example and must make it appear non-
adversarial. During training, the authors train on adver-
sarial examples generated with the Fast Gradient Sign
algorithm [3]; despite this, the authors claim robustness
on a wide range of attacks (including [1]).
Defense Models. We take the MagNet implementation
from the authors’ open-source code 1 and train our own
models. Since the provided code does not include an im-
plementation of the CIFAR defense and classifier, we im-
plement it as described in the paper.
We were unable to obtain source code for “Efficient
Defenses...”. We therefore re-implement the proposed
defense based on the description in the paper. We take
the APE-GAN implementation from the authors open-
source code 2.
We use the C&W attack given by the authors. We also
release our code 3 4 5.
3 Breaking MagNet
We demonstrate MagNet is not robust by generating
transferable adversarial examples with Carlini and Wag-
ner’s L2 attack. To do this, we (as the adversary) train
32 local auto-encoders to use as detectors and reformers
(different than the 16 the defender will use). To generate
1https://github.com/Trevillie/MagNet
2https://github.com/shenqixiaojiang/APE-GAN
3https://github.com/carlini/MagNet
4https://github.com/carlini/breaking_
efficient_defenses
5https://github.com/carlini/APE-GAN
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Dataset Model Success Distortion (L2)
MNIST Unsecured 100% 1.64MagNet 99% 2.25
CIFAR Unsecured 100% 0.30MagNet 100% 0.45
Table 1: The success rate of our attack on MagNet. The last
column shows the mean distance to the nearest targeted adver-
sarial example, across the first 1000 test instances, with the tar-
get chosen uniformly at random from the incorrect classes.
adversarial examples, we modify the optimization for-
mulation to the following, where reformers are denoted
Rj and the detectors Dj :
minimize ‖x′ − x‖22 + c · `c(x′) + d · `d(x′)
where the classifier loss function `c is defined as
`c(x
′) =
∑
j
max(max
i 6=t
Z(Rj(x
′))i − Z(Rj(x′))t,−κ)
and the detector loss function `d is defined as
`d(x
′) =
∑
j
max(Dj(x
′)− τj , 0).
Here, c and d are chosen via binary search simultane-
ously. The threshold τj is chosen such that 1% of vali-
dation images are detected as adversarial. (The true de-
fender sets their remote τ to reject only 0.1% of instances
[8]: ours is more strict to help the attack construct adver-
sarial examples that fool the remote detectors more of-
ten.) We set the confidence κ = 1 so that the adversarial
examples are more likely to transfer.
We attack by performing 10000 iterations of gradient
descent with a learning rate of 10−2. We did not perform
hyperparameter search (e.g., picking 32 auto-encoders,
κ = 1, τj = 0.01); improved search over these parame-
ters would yield lower distortion adversarial examples.
Figures 1 and 2 contain images of targeted adversar-
ial examples on on the secured network, and Table 1 the
mean distortion required across the first 1000 instances
of the test set with targets chosen uniformly at random
among the incorrect classes.
Figure 1: MagNet targeted adversarial examples for each
source/target pair of images on MNIST. We achieve a 99%
grey-box success (the 7→ 6 attack failed to transfer).
Figure 2: MagNet targeted adversarial examples for each
source/target pair of images on CIFAR. We achieve a 100%
grey-box success.
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Dataset Model Distortion (L2)
MNIST
Unsecured 2.04
BReLU 2.14
Gaussian Noise 2.66
Gaussian Noise + BReLU 2.58
CIFAR
Unsecured 0.56
BReLU 0.58
Gaussian Noise 0.66
Gaussian Noise + BReLU 0.67
Table 2: Neither adding Gaussian data augmentation during
training nor using the BReLU activation significantly increases
robustness to adversarial examples on the MNIST or CIFAR-10
datasets; success rate is always 100%.
4 Breaking “Efficient Defenses...”
We demonstrate this defense is not robust by generating
adversarial examples with Carlini and Wagner’s L2 at-
tack. We do nothing more than apply the attack to the
defended network.
Figure 3 contains images of adversarial examples on
the secured network, and Table 2 the mean distortion re-
quired across the first 1000 instances of the test set with
targets chosen at random among the incorrect classes.
On MNIST, the full defense increases mean distance
to the nearest adversarial example by 30%, and on CI-
FAR by 20%. This is in contrast with other forms of
retraining, such as adversarial retraining [7], which in-
crease distortion by a significantly larger amount. Inter-
estingly, we find that BReLU provides some increase in
distortion when trained without Gaussian augmentation,
but when trained with it, does not help.
5 Breaking APE-GAN
We demonstrate APE-GAN is not robust by generating
adversarial examples with Carlini and Wagner’s L2 at-
tack. We do nothing more than apply the attack to de-
fended network. That is, we change the loss function to
account for the fact that the manifold-projection is done
before classification. Specifically, we let
`(x′) = max(max{Z(G(x′))i : i 6= t} − Z(G(x′))t, 0)
and solve the same minimization formulation.
Figure 4 contains images of adversarial examples on
APE-GAN, and Table 3 the mean distortion required
across the first 1000 instances of the test set with targets
chosen at random among the incorrect classes.
Dataset Model Success Distortion (L2)
MNIST Unsecured 100% 2.04APE-GAN 100% 2.17
CIFAR Unsecured 100% 0.43APE-GAN 100% 0.72
Table 3: APE-GAN does not significantly increase robustness
to adversarial examples on the MNIST or CIFAR-10 datasets.
Investigating APE-GAN’s Failure. Why are we able to
fool APE-GAN? We compare (a) the mean distance be-
tween the original inputs and the adversarial examples,
and (b) the mean distance between the original inputs
and the recovered adversarial examples. We find that
the recovered adversarial examples are less similar to the
original than the adversarial examples. Specifically, the
mean distortion between the adversarial examples and
the original instances is 4.3, whereas the mean distortion
between the recovered instances and original instances is
5.8.
This indicates that what our adversarial examples have
done is fool the generator G into giving reconstructions
that are even less similar from the original than the adver-
sarial example. This effect can be observed in Figure 4:
faint lines introduced become more pronounced after re-
construction.
6 Conclusion
As this short paper demonstrates, MagNet is not robust to
transferable adversarial examples, and combining Gaus-
sian data augmentation and BReLU activations does not
significantly increase the robustness of a neural network
against strong iterative attacks. Surprisingly, we found
that while all three defenses take different approaches to
increasing the robustness against adversarial examples,
they all give approximately the same increase in robust-
ness (∼ 30%).
We recommend that researchers who propose defenses
attempt adaptive white-box attacks against their schemes
before claiming robustness. Or, if arguing security in the
grey-box threat model, we recommend researchers gen-
erate adversarial examples targeting the specific defense
by using a copy of that defense as the source model. Just
because the adversary is not aware of the exact parame-
ters, does not mean the best that can be done is to transfer
from an unsecured model: as we have shown here, trans-
fering from a local copy of the model improves the attack
success rate.
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(a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c)
Figure 3: Attacks on “Efficient Defenses...” on MNIST and
CIFAR-10: (a) original reference image; (b) adversarial exam-
ple on the defense with only BReLU; (c) adversarial example
on the complete defense with Gaussian noise and BReLU.
(a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c)
Figure 4: Attacks on APE-GAN on MNIST and CIFAR-10:
(a) original reference image; (b) adversarial example on APE-
GAN; (c) reconstructed adversarial example.
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